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Introduction
In recent decades, progress toward a world economy that is integrated
across national boundaries has been especially dramatic in the liberalization of international trade in goods. Economists generally welcome this
development, prescribing free trade as the regime that maximizes global
economic welfare. Economists also recommend liberalized trade as a policy that is likely to produce gains for each national economy. Economists
recognize that the same theory that applies to goods also applies to international trade in other markets. Nations can gain from not only the free
movement of goods across national boundaries but also the free movement
of labor across national boundaries.1
The basic intuition for this result derives from the gains from international trade in the labor market. We would expect labor to migrate from
low-wage countries to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a
T Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Copyright © 2008 by Howard F.
Chang. I would like to thank Joseph Carens, Stephen Perry, Joshua Rabinowitz, and
conference participants at Cornell University, at the University of Pennsylvania, at
Sacramento State University, and at the University of Gloucestershire for helpful
comments.
1. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1148-50 (1997).
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result of migration, world output rises. Higher wages in the host country
imply that the marginal product of labor is higher there than in the source
country. That is, higher wages for the same worker mean that the worker
produces more value in the host country than in the source country. Labor
migration generally leads to net gains in wealth for the world as a whole
because labor flows to the country where it has the higher value use. 2 For
this reason, economic theory raises a presumption in favor of the free
movement of labor. Migration restrictions distort the global labor market,
producing a misallocation of labor among countries, thereby wasting
human resources and creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant
countries. The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger
the distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restrictions, and
the larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor migration. Given the
degree of wage inequality in the world today, it should be apparent that the
gains from liberalized migration are huge.
Despite the presumption that economic theory raises in favor of international labor mobility, the nations of the world maintain restrictions on
immigration and show little inclination to liberalize these barriers significantly. To some degree, however, globalization proceeds in the labor market despite the immigration barriers that states raise. In the United States,
for example, there are probably more than ten million unauthorized immigrants residing among us today, accounting for more than 3% of the total
U.S. population, with 700,000 more unauthorized immigrants arriving
each year on average. 3 Thus, the global labor market resists attempts by
states to restrict the flow of labor across borders.
Most unauthorized immigrants in the United States come from Mexico, 4 where workers earn one-ninth of the amount that they can earn in the
United States.5 Given the disparity in wages between these labor markets
and the tight restrictions on the legal entry of workers, the incentives for
illegal immigration are enormous. Indeed, in recent years, hundreds of
unauthorized immigrants have died attempting to enter the United States
from Mexico under dangerous conditions, and these deaths have given a
6
sense of urgency to the campaign for liberalized immigration laws.
Efforts to liberalize restrictions on the flow of workers into the United
States have picked up momentum recently as President George W. Bush
has proposed an expanded guest-worker program that would allow unau2. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND POLICY 162-63 (6th ed. 2003).

3. SeeJEEEREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 3, 6 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?

ReportlD=46. The total population of the United States reached 300 million in October
2006. See Sam Roberts, A 300 Millionth American, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A15.
4. PASSEL, supra note 3, at 4.
5. See Mexican Deportees Report Good Treatment, UPI, Apr. 21, 1996, available at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that Mexican immigrants received an average
of $278 per week in the United States, compared with the equivalent of $30.81 per week
in Mexico).
6. See, e.g., Senate Committee Conducts Hearing on Immigration Reform Legislation,
82 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1243, 1244 (2005) (comments of Sen. John McCain).
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thorized immigrants to legalize their status as guest workers. 7 The Senate
passed a bill in 2006 that would establish such a guest-worker program
and also expand opportunities for legal immigration and permanent residence, gathering broad bipartisan support. 8 Although the Republican
majority in the House of Representatives failed to support the Senate bill,
the November 2006 elections, which shifted control of the House to the
Democrats, improved the prospects for liberalized immigration laws in the
near future. 9
In this article, I argue that considerations of not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice militate in favor of liberalized immigration laws in countries like the United States. First, in Part I, I review the
economic theory and empirical evidence regarding the impact of international labor migration.' 0 This literature indicates that even partial liberalization of international migration would produce substantial increases in
the world's real income and improve its distribution by reducing international inequality. This literature also suggests that immigration has had
only a small adverse effect on the distribution of income among natives in
the United States. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that the most
efficient response to concerns about the distribution of income among
natives is to increase the progressivity of our tax system, rather than to
restrict immigration. Restrictive immigration policies are not only likely to
be relatively costly as an instrument for redistribution among natives but
also perverse from the standpoint of global distributive justice. In Part II, I
turn to the ethical question of whether countries of immigration have a
moral duty to reduce global economic inequality. I argue that the liberal
ideals espoused by countries like the United States require a global view of
distributive justice, and I respond to some of the alternative conceptions
advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan perspective. Finally, in Part Ill, I
conclude with normative implications for immigration reforms in liberal
states.
1. The Economic Effects of International Labor Migration
A survey of recent estimates of the economic impacts of international
labor migration indicates that liberalization of this migration would produce substantial increases in the world's real income and improve its distribution. Moreover, estimates of the impact of immigration on native
workers in the United States indicate that only the least skilled native work7. See, e.g., Pres. Bush Renews Callfor a Temporary Worker Program, 82 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 274 (2005); President Bush Announces Immigration Initiative, 81 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 33 (2004).

8. See Senate Passes Immigration Bill, Conference Needed to Resolve Senate and House
Differences, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1037 (2006).

9. See Randal C. Archibold, Democratic Victory Raises Spirits of Those Favoring Citizenship for Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A27.

10. For a more comprehensive survey of this literature, see Howard F. Chang, The
Economic Impact of International Labor Migration: Recent Estimates and Policy Implications, 16

TEMP. POL.

& Civ.

RTS. L. REV.

321 (2007).
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ers suffer adverse effects and that these effects are small. Although immigration restrictions may prevent these adverse effects, these restrictions are
not only likely to be costly as a response to concerns about income distribution among natives but also perverse from the standpoint of global distributive justice.
A.

Distribution of the Gains from International Migration

Some economists have attempted to estimate the gains that the world
could enjoy by liberalizing migration. For example, in an early study using
data from 1977, Bob Hamilton and John Whalley produced a range of estimates based on various assumptions about critical parameters, but all of
their estimates suggest that the potential gains are enormous." Many of
their estimates indicate that the elimination of immigration restrictions
could more than double the world's real income, and even their most conservative estimate indicates that the world's real income would rise by
13%.12 They also find that liberalized migration would reduce global ine13
quality by raising wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers.
In a recent study applying the same assumptions to 1998 data,
Jonathon Moses and Bjorn Letnes produced similar results, finding that
"the estimated efficiency gains from liberalizing immigration controls have
only increased over time" as a result of the increase in "wage ...inequalities over the past 20 years."'14 Even when they adopt more conservative
assumptions, "the estimated gains remain substantial," ranging from 5.6%
to 12.3% of the world's real income, or from $1.97 trillion to $4.33 trillion
per year.' 5 Given that even their most conservative estimates "exceed the
combined current levels of development assistance and foreign direct
investment to the developing world," they suggest that "international
migration may be one of the most effective means of shrinking the income
gap that separates rich and poor countries."' 6 Furthermore, their estimates of the benefits of partial liberalization of migration controls indicate
that "a substantial portion of these gains can be reaped without allowing
for full migration," because even small increases in migration "could produce significant economic gains," large enough to "dwarf those generated
17
by traditional development policies."'
The World Bank has recently studied the potential gains from such a
11. See Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and DistributionalImplications of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14 J. DEv. ECON. 61 (1984).
12. See id. at 70-72.
13. See id. at 73-74.
14. Jonathon W. Moses & Bjorn Letnes, The Economic Costs to International Labor
Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion, 32 WORLD DEV. 1609, 1610, 1619
(2004).
15. Id. at 1616. The estimated gains in what they consider "the most reasonable ...
scenario" are $3.39 trillion per year, or 9.6% of the world's real income. Id. at 1615-16.
16. Id. at 1620.
17. Id. at 1610; see id. at 1616-18.
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limited increase in international migration. 18 The World Bank economists
consider the effects of an increase in migration from "developing" countries to "high-income countries" sufficient to increase the labor force in the
host countries by 3% by the year 2025.19 They conclude that this scenario
"would generate large increases in global welfare," 20 increasing the world's
real income by 0.6%, that is, by $356 billion in 2025.21
Would the effects of immigrant workers in the labor market, however,
be in the economic interest of natives in the countries of immigration? If
we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market, we find that the
natives of a host country, taken together, will gain from the immigration of
labor. 2 2 Wages may fall for those native workers who compete with immigrant labor, but this loss for those workers is a pure transfer among natives:
it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ labor and ultimately for
23
Furthermore,
consumers, who obtain goods and services at lower cost.

natives gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain surplus in
excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor. 2 4 Thus, natives as a
group enjoy a net gain from employing immigrants. 25 In fact, the World
Bank economists estimate that the high-income countries receiving immian increase of 0.4% in
grants in their liberalization scenario would enjoy
26
their real income, that is, a gain of $139 billion.
In addition, immigrants also gain from their own migration. They
obtain higher wages than in their source countries and thereby enjoy far
larger gains per capita than natives in host countries do from their immigration. In the scenario analyzed by the World Bank, the additional
migrants allowed to move under liberalized immigration policies nearly
triple their own real income on average, enjoying a gain of $162 billion,
even after subtracting remittances sent back to those left behind in their
countries of origin.2 7 In this sense, labor migration represents a form of
international trade in which the source country exports labor to the host
country. 28 Like international trade in goods, labor migration allows forbuyers, allowing both pareign suppliers to sell their services to domestic
29
ties in each transaction to gain from trade.
18. See

WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION

2006:

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF

(2006).

19. Id. at 25.
20. Id. at 26.
21. See id. at 31.
22. See
FISCAL

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC,

EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 135-53 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds.,
1997).
23. See id. at 138-39.
24. See id. at 139 (stating that immigrants are paid less than the value of the new
goods and services that they help produce).
25. See id.
26. See WORLD BANK, supra note 18, at 34.
27. See id. (predicting that the migrants would increase their real income by 199%).
28. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 146 (comparing immigration
to international trade in products).
29. See id. (concluding that the reasons explaining the net national gain from trading
with other countries also explain the net national gain from immigration).
AND
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In theory, migration may make those left behind in the source countries worse off insofar as they no longer enjoy the gains from trade that
they enjoyed from employing the workers who have emigrated. Workers
left behind may enjoy an increase in wages as a result of the departure of
competing workers, but employers and their consumers would lose more
from the departure of those emigrants than the workers left behind would
gain from their departure. 30 As long as the migrants allowed to move
under the liberalization analyzed by the World Bank send the same proportion of their income to those left behind in source countries as that sent by
existing migrants, however, the World Bank estimates that with these remittances, those left behind would enjoy a net increase of 0.9% in their real
income, that is, a gain of $143 billion. 3 1 Developing countries, including
the migrants allowed to move in this scenario, enjoy an increase of 1.8% in
their real income. 3 2 Thus, "the relative gains are much higher for developing-country households than high-income country households," not only
increasing the world's real income, but also reducing international income
33
inequality.
An understanding of the economic effects of international labor
migration gives us some reasons to question the claims of Thomas Pogge,
who argues that "those who accept a weighty moral responsibility toward
needy foreigners should devote their time, energy, and resources not to the
struggle to get more of them admitted into the rich countries, but ratherto
the struggle to institute an effective programme of global poverty eradication," which would transfer resources from rich countries to programs to
help the global poor. 3 4 Although he agrees that "richer states ought to
admit more needy persons," he explains that "we should expend our scarce
political energy and resources" on "other moral projects with regard to
which our mobilizing efforts can be much more effective."'3 5 Our review of
the economics of labor migration, however, casts some doubt on the empirical claims on which Pogge relies.
First, Pogge notes that the "number of desperate foreigners" that richer
states "might conceivably come to admit ...

are ridiculously small in com-

parison to the number of those who are in desperate need."3 6 This observation would suggest that liberalized immigration would be relatively
ineffective in reducing global poverty, but only if we assume that only
those who migrate would benefit from liberalization. Labor migration confers important benefits on the poor who remain in source countries, however, not only through remittances but also by increasing the wages of
workers left behind. Given this wealth transfer to poor workers and away
from their employers in developing countries, migration would not only
30.
31.
32.
33.

See WORLD BANK, supra note 18, at 57-58.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 31.
Id. at 35.

34. Thomas Pogge, Migration and Poverty, in CITIZENSHIP AND ExCLUSION 12, 14 (Veit

Bader ed., 1997).
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 13.
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increase incomes for migrants but also tend to reduce income inequality in
poor countries.
Second, Pogge argues that transfers of wealth from rich countries to
programs for the global poor would be more feasible politically than liberalized immigration policies. 3 7 The economics of labor migration, however,
indicate that liberalized immigration policies would confer net gains not
only on the migrants and their source countries but also on natives in host
countries. These gains from trade suggest a reason to favor migration over
transfer policies on the merits: whereas labor migration is a positive-sum
game for the world as a whole, transfers are at best a zero-sum game. Furthermore, these gains for natives of host countries suggest some reason to
believe that liberalized admissions are more likely to prove politically feasible than the transfer policies that would produce the same benefit for the
global poor, despite Pogge's claims to the contrary. After all, whereas transfer policies would impose costs on rich countries, liberalized admissions
for workers from poor countries would confer net economic benefits on
38
natives of host countries.
B. Distribution Among Natives in the United States
Despite the significant gains from international trade in the labor market, countries often restrict immigration to protect native workers from the
unemployment or the wage reductions that the entry of foreign workers
would supposedly entail. In this sense, immigration barriers, like trade
barriers, are protectionist: they are designed to protect natives from foreign
competition. 3 9 Protectionists often defend these barriers as policies that
promote a more equal distribution of income among natives, pointing to
the adverse effects of immigration on the welfare of the least skilled workers in particular. Contrary to popular belief, however, these concerns for
distributive justice do not provide a sound justification for our restrictive
immigration laws.
First, as I have noted elsewhere:
[C]oncerns regarding income inequality do not justify any restrictions on
skilled immigration, because skilled immigrants not only increase total
wealth for natives but also promote a more equitable distribution of income
among natives. They are likely to have an adverse effect only on competing
skilled natives and increase the real wages of everyone else, including less
37. See id. at 16-22. Pogge proposes raising funds for the global poor from "general
tax revenues" in "rich countries" or from other sources that would place a fiscal burden
on the global rich. Id. at 19; see id. at 19-21.
38. To the extent that Pogge relies on "the hostility and anger" that poor immigrants
"generate among our compatriots" to support his claims, id. at 22, he may be unduly
pessimistic about our ability to overcome such intolerance. As I have argued elsewhere,
these xenophobic or racist attitudes may be "more amenable to reform than the tendency of natives to pursue their own self-interest." Howard F. Chang, Immigration and
the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions as Employment Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 291, 320 (2003). "The evolution of attitudes in the United States toward ethnic
groups once greeted with hostility offers hope that more tolerant attitudes will eventually prevail with respect to those who currently dominate the immigrant flow." Id.
39. See Chang, supra note 38, at 308.
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skilled natives, who enjoy the benefits of a greater supply of skilled labor.
Therefore, the pursuit of a more equal distribution of income would at most
have an
justify concerns regarding unskilled immigration, which could
40
adverse effect on the real wages of unskilled native workers.
Second, studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets
have shown little evidence of any significant effects on native wages or
employment, even for the least skilled native workers. 4 1 Given the small
effects of immigration on native wages and employment, protectionist policies seem particularly misguided. David Card's influential study of the
effect of the Mariel Cubans on the Miami labor market, for example, produces fairly typical results for this literature: he found that the arrival of
125,000 Cubans in 1980, which increased the supply of labor in Miami by
7% almost overnight, had virtually no effect on the wages and employment
opportunities for workers in Miami, including unskilled whites and
42
unskilled blacks.
Immigrants have had little adverse impact on the wages and employment of natives in part because "the demand for labor does not remain
fixed when immigrants enter the economy, ' 43 as I have explained elsewhere: "Immigrant workers not only supply labor, for example, they also
demand goods and services, and this demand will translate into greater
demand for locally supplied labor."' 44 An influx of labor will also create a
profit opportunity for investors, which in turn will attract capital to the
economic activities employing the immigrant labor. This expansion in the
sector of the economy employing this labor will also increase the demand
for that labor, which in turn would tend to offset the effect of increased
45
supply.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and
natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market, so they often do not
compete for the same jobs. 46 In fact, labor markets are highly segregated,
with immigrant labor concentrated in some occupations while natives are
40. Id.
41. See GeorgeJ. Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, 32J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1667,
1697-98 (1994) (concluding that empirical estimates suggest that the effect of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives is small); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer
Hunt, The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth, J. EcON.
PERsp., Spring 1995, at 23, 42 (same).
42. See David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245, 256 (1990).
43. Chang, supra note 38, at 306.
44. Id.
45. Thus, by shifting resources to the sectors of the economy employing immigrants,
an economy can mitigate or even eliminate the adverse effects that immigrant workers
may have on the wages of competing native workers. See Noel Gaston & Douglas Nelson, Immigration and Labour-Market Outcomes in the United States: A Political-Economy
Puzzle, 16 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 104, 108 (2000) (noting that "some of the adjustment ... will occur via a change in the output mix, reducing the.., costs to the competing factor (i.e. domestic unskilled labour)").
46. See generally Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596 (1982).
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concentrated in others. 4 7 Immigrants compete with one another far more
than they compete with natives. 48 Indeed, some immigrant labor can be a
complement rather than a substitute for some native labor, so that an
increase in the supply of immigrant labor will increase the demand for
native labor and thus have positive effects on native wages rather than negative effects.
Nevertheless, some economists claim that immigration has had a significant adverse impact on the least skilled native workers. 4 9 It is important, however, to interpret these claims carefully in light of the positive
effects of immigration on the demand for native labor. Recent work by
Borjas, in particular, is often cited by restrictionists for his large estimates
of the effect of immigrants on native wages. In a study published in 2003,
he attempts to estimate the effect of all immigration between 1980 and
2000 on native workers in the United States, concluding that the large
influx of workers over these two decades reduced the wage of the average
native worker by 3.2% and the wage of high-school dropouts by 8.9% during this period. 50 These results, however, are based on a simulation that
makes two extreme assumptions. First, he assumes that immigrants are
perfect substitutes for natives within each class of labor. Second, he
assumes that the capital stock is fixed and does not respond to this immigration by increasing the supply of capital to the economic activities
employing this expanded supply of labor, thereby increasing the demand
for the labor in question. 5 1 Given these unrealistic assumptions, his simulation is inherently biased in favor of finding large adverse effects on native
workers.
A more recent study by Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri uses a
simulation that instead allows the supply of capital to adjust and allows
immigrants and natives within each class of labor to be imperfect substitutes.5 2 By relaxing the unrealistic assumptions used by Borjas in his
study, Ottaviano and Peri produce dramatically different results. Once
they allow the capital stock to adjust fully, they estimate that all immigration into the United States from 1990 to 2004 increased the average wage of
native workers by 1.8% and decreased the wage of native high-school drop47. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 218 (concluding that the data

suggest that "the jobs of immigrant and native workers are different").
48. Thus, immigration does have a more substantial adverse effect on the wages of
other immigrants, who are much closer substitutes for new immigrants. See id. at 223
("The one group that appears to suffer significant negative effects from new immigrants
are earlier waves of immigrants, according to many studies.").
49.
CAN

See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERI-

ECONOMY 99 (1999) (claiming that immigration "transfers a substantial amount of

wealth away from the workers who compete with immigrants to the natives who have
skills or physical resources that benefit from the presence of immigrants" and that "it is
the less-skilled natives who pay the price of immigration").
50. GeorgeJ. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the

Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1335, 1368 (2003).
51. Id. ("[aIssuming that the capital stock is constant").
52. See Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on Wages 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12497, 2006).
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outs by only 1.1%. 53 Indeed, they find that all native workers with at least
a high school education enjoy increased wages as a result of this immigration rather than reduced wages. 54 Thus, this influx of immigrants had an
adverse effect only on the shrinking minority of native workers with less
than a high school education, 55 and this effect was quite small.
C.

Protectionism and Distributive Justice

We may want to prevent even relatively small'reductions in the wages
of our least skilled workers, and protectionists may defend immigration
restrictions on this basis. Like trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacrifice gains from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as
a group. In this sense, protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth
from some natives to others. 56 We could redistribute the same wealth
through tax policies and transfer programs rather than through protectionism and probably would thereby make all classes of natives better off than
policies, because immigration prothey are under restrictive immigration 57
group.
a
as
natives
for
gains
net
duces
If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from adverse changes in
the distribution of income, then progressive reforms of tax and transfer
policies are likely to prove less costly than protectionist immigration
restrictions. As long as immigration increases total wealth, those who gain
from immigration can compensate those who lose and still be better off. 58
Redistribution can shift the costs of liberalized immigration policies to the
beneficiaries of liberalization. Protectionist policies currently impose an
implicit tax on natives that probably costs them more than the explicit tax
that would be necessary to compensate unskilled native workers for the
effects of liberalized immigration policies. 59 Once we recognize that protectionism is merely a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it should be
apparent that there is no good reason to favor protectionism over less costly
and more efficient transfer policies.
We could probably achieve redistribution more efficiently and equitably by expanding programs already in place in our tax system. Given the
small adverse effects of immigration and the small number of native workers who find their wages reduced by the influx of immigrant labor, a fairly
small increase in the progressivity of our tax rates would suffice to compensate the few who lose income as a result of competition from immigrant
53.
54.
55.
lacked

See id. at 4.
See id.
See BORjAS, supra note 49, at 27 (noting that "by 1998, only 9 percent of natives
a high school diploma" and showing how this percentage declined steadily over

the preceding four decades); NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

supra note 22, at 228 (noting

that "[bly 1995, high school dropouts represented less than 10 percent of the American
workforce" and were "a declining group of American workers").
56. See Chang, supra note 38, at 308.
57. See id. at 309-11.
58. See id. at 309.
59. See id.
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workers. 60 We could make Social Security taxes more progressive, for
example, or we could increase the earned income tax credit and liberalize
its requirements.
Furthermore, this discussion of distributive justice among natives has
ignored the benefits that the immigrants themselves enjoy from their access
to our labor markets and the benefits that flow to people overseas in the
form of remittances. This discussion has assumed that the welfare of
immigrants and people overseas is of no concern to us. Once we give some
weight to the interests of those born outside our borders, however, we have
yet another reason to liberalize immigration. Once we recognize any moral
obligation to reduce poverty abroad and to reduce global inequality, we
must confront the significant economic harm we inflict on those we
exclude under our restrictive immigration laws. Given the adverse effects
of restrictive immigration policies on the poor abroad, considerations of
global justice militate in favor of progressive fiscal policies and against protectionism as a method of addressing any concerns regarding the distribution of income among natives.
I.

Liberal Ideals and Global Distributive Justice

Immigration restrictions keep disadvantaged groups of people in conditions of poverty and deprive them of equal access to important economic
opportunities. In this sense, as I have argued elsewhere, immigration
restrictions are much like laws mandating employment discrimination or
residential segregation in the domestic context. 6 1 When it comes to racial
segregation in the domestic context, we condemn segregation for keeping
disadvantaged groups in an underclass, cut off from valuable social and
economic opportunities. For example, our courts refuse to enforce zoning
ordinances.or racially restrictive covenants that exclude blacks from white
neighborhoods. 6 2 We would not consider such laws or covenants any
more acceptable if they excluded aliens rather than racial minorities from
local communities. 6 3 If we would reject such exclusionary practices as vio60. See id. at 310-11.
61. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Cultural Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 93 (2007); Chang,
supra note 38.
62. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-*
ment prohibits states from enforcing racially restrictive covenants); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws that forbid
blacks to reside in white neighborhoods).
63. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (declaring that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on . . . race, are inherently suspect"). The
author of the Graham opinion would later explain that "aliens often have been the victims of irrational discrimination" and "historically have been disabled by the prejudice
of the majority," which "led the Court to conclude that alienage classifications 'in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy' . . . and therefore demand close judicial scrutiny." Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). The Graham court struck down state laws
conditioning access to welfare benefits on either U.S. citizenship or residence in the
United States for a specified number of years. See Graham, 403 U.S. 365. Recognizing

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 41

lations of liberal principles of equality, then why should exclusion be any
more legitimate when the exclusion occurs on a national scale rather than
at the local level? Why should it be less troubling to exclude an alien from
an entire country rather than from a single neighborhood? Expanding the
geographic scope of the community from which we exclude the alien only
64
broadens the range of opportunities that we thereby deny that alien.
One might object to the analogy that I draw between immigration
restrictions and segregation in the domestic context by challenging my premise that aliens are as entitled to distributive justice under our laws as
natives. In particular, one might claim that we do not owe the same concern to prospective immigrants as we do to incumbent residents. In comparing immigration restrictions to de jure segregation in the domestic
context, I have relied on the premise that prospective immigrants as well as
natives are entitled to equal concern. 65 I suggest here that the liberal ideals
expressed in our declaration that "all men are created equal" 66 require
such a cosmopolitan perspective.
Consider the notion of equal concern expressed in the liberal theory
of justice developed by John Rawls, who asks what principles individuals
would choose behind a "veil of ignorance."' 67 In this "original position,"
individuals know nothing about their own personal circumstances or
traits; thus, "they do not know how the various alternatives will affect their
own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on
the basis of general considerations. ' 68 This position ensures that the parties are "fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons. ' 69 Rawls,
however, includes only persons within a single "society," which he
describes as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage," as participants
in the original position. 70 That is, he assumes that the "boundaries" of his
principles of justice "are given by the notion of a self-contained national
'7 1
community."
the tension between the Graham reasoning and federal immigration restrictions, however, the Supreme Court would later refuse to apply the same scrutiny to federal laws
discriminating against aliens. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-87 (1976).
64. See Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement
of People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 224 (1971) ("May we expect the lesson
which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be
repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 'desegregation' of nation states?"); see also Darrel Moellendorf, Equality of Opportunity Globalized?, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 301 (2006) (defending the principle of global
equality of opportunity). The analogy between racial segregation and immigration
restrictions suggests that we should view the campaign for liberalized immigration policies as a natural extension of the civil rights movement. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bill
Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospectsfor a New Civil Rights
Movement, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007).
65. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 38, at 295-302.
66. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
68. Id. at 136-37; see id. at 141 ("If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the
outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies.").

69. Id. at 141.
70.

Id. at 4.

71.

Id. at 457.
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This assumption, however, raises the question of whether a world in
which nations engage in international trade in goods, services, capital, and
labor is a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage. '7 2 In light of this
international cooperation, Charles Beitz and others have argued that the
entire world is a "society" in which all individuals would be parties to the
original position. 73 Beitz suggests that "we should not view national
boundaries as having fundamental moral significance" and that "principles
74
of justice" should "therefore apply globally."
Furthermore, place of birth would appear to be a circumstance that
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."'75 Pogge notes
that nationality based on such a circumstance "is just one further deep
contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one
more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are ...

present from

birth. '7 6 "Within Rawls's conception," Pogge suggests, "there is no reason
to treat this case differently from the others. '7 7 Thus, Pogge also argues in
78
favor of globalizing Rawls's principles of justice.
72. Id. at 4.
73. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143-53
(1979) (arguing that sufficient cooperation and interdependence exists among nations
to justify a global view of the original position); see also THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS

257 (1989) (noting that "it would seem difficult in a context of tight global interdependence to maintain the sharp distinction between national and international institutions"
adopted by Rawls); Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1020, 1066-67 (1973) (arguing that "considerations of justice apply at least wherever
there is systematic economic interaction" and that therefore Rawls's principles of justice
"apply to the world economic system taken as a whole").
74. BEITZ, supra note 73, at 151. Others have argued that "the salience of global
justice is increasing in the density of interactions across borders." AJ. Julius, Nagel's
Atlas, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 176, 187 (2006); see, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel,
Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?,34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 147, 164-75 (2006) (arguing
that obligations of global justice have increased with greater international cooperation
and interdependence); Julius, supra, at 178 (arguing that "members of different states
are in the justice relation if their interaction links them densely enough"). For a critique
of any theory of justice that makes obligations of distributive justice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation, see Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty,
DistributiveJustice, and Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 769-71 (2003).
75. RAWLS, supra note 67, at 72.
76. POGGE, supra note 73, at 247.
77. Id. Similarly, Peter Singer argues that Rawls's stated goal of a theory of justice in
which "no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances" and a theory that is
"indifferent to the consequences of something as contingent as which side of a national
border one happens to live" simply "cannot be reconciled." PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD
177 (2002).
78. See POGGE, supra note 73, at 240-80; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 264 (2006) (agreeing that it is "far
more appealing" for us "to think of the Original Position as applied directly to the world
as a whole" because "national origin is rather like class background, parental wealth,
race, and sex: namely, a contingent fact about a person that should not be permitted to
deform a person's life"). Following in this tradition, I have argued elsewhere in favor of
a cosmopolitan interpretation of the "original position." See, e.g., Chang, supra note 74,
at 768-73.
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Citing Beitz and others, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immigration restrictions as a question of social justice using a global interpretation
of Rawls's original position. 79 In seeking a justification for the exclusion
of aliens, he suggests, "we don't want to be biased by self-interested or partisan considerations" and instead "can take it as a basic presupposition
that we should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society, as free and equal moral persons."8 0 Carens identifies this premise as a
basic feature of all liberal political theories,"' concluding that we should
82
"take a global, not a national view of the original position."
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration barriers are morally suspect and demand justification. All immigration restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their alienage. Most aliens
are born aliens because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens based
on immutable characteristics, including the geographic location of their
birth (that is, national origin) and the citizenship of their parents at the
time of their birth.8 3 This discrimination based explicitly on circumstances of birth is at odds with liberal ideals. Carens concludes that we
cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens were more entitled to the benefits
of citizenship than those born elsewhere or of alien parents."8 4 Similarly,
in a utilitarian calculation of global welfare, "current citizens would enjoy
no privileged position. '8 5 Carens concludes from these liberal premises
that "we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than we
do now."8 6 Carens condemns our immigration restrictions: "Like feudal
barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege. ' 8 7 How might a liberal
79. SeeJoseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Casefor Open Borders, 49 REv. POL.
251, 255, 272 n.8 (1987) (citing BEITZ, supra note 73; Scanlon, supra note 73; and
others).
80. Id. at 256.
81. See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must
respect all human beings as moral persons," which "entails recognition ... of the freedom and equality of every human being"); see also id. at 269 ("No moral argument will
seem acceptable ... if it directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of
all individuals."). This liberal commitment to moral equality in the public sphere does
not imply that individuals are wrong to favor their friends or families using their own
private resources. Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that equality "denotes a regulative
ideal for political, not personal, conduct." KWAME ANTHONY

APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDEN-

TrY 230 (2005). "Social justice may require impartiality - or evenhandedness, or fairness, or . . . 'neutrality,"' he explains, "[b]ut social justice is not an attribute of
individuals." Id. at 228. Although the state may be "bound by moral equality," it would
be "wrong... to suppose that individuals should be subject to the same constraint." Id.
82. Id. at 256.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born ... in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States ....");8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2000) (setting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth").
84. Carens, supra note 79, at 261.
85. Id. at 263 ("[Tlhe utilitarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the
assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility
is calculated.").
86. Id. at 270.
87. Id. Others have reached similar conclusions regarding immigration restrictions
in liberal political theory. See, e.g., BRUCE A.

ACKERMAN,

SOCIAL

JUSTICE IN

THE LIBERAL
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nevertheless reject the extension of our principles of distributive justice to
prospective immigrants?
A.

State Coercion

Although Michael Blake concedes that liberalism is "committed to
moral equality, so that the simple fact of humanity is sufficient to motivate
a demand for equal concern and respect,"8 8 he defends "distinct principles
of distributive justice applicable only within the national context." 8 9 In
particular, he argues that "a concern for specifically economic egalitarianism is only morally required within the context of a domestic legal system," 90 where "distinct burdens of justification" apply "between
individuals who share liability to the coercive power of the state."9 1 He
claims that it is only in the "search for the justification of state coercion"
92
that "egalitarian distributive justice becomes relevant."
Although Blake seeks to use state coercion to distinguish the domestic
context from the international context, his suggestion that we focus on
state coercion does not distinguish prospective immigrants from incumbent residents. After all, we exclude prospective immigrants through the
use or threat of force applied by the state. 9 3 In this sense, all aliens are
subject to exclusion under the immigration laws enforced by our state, and
they may demand that we justify this coercive exclusion within a frame-

94
work of equal concern and respect for all.

Blake recognizes this problem but asserts that "each distinct form of
coercion requires a distinct form of justification." 9 5 Without elaborating,
STATE 93 (1980) ("1 cannot justify my power to exclude you without destroying my own
claim to membership in an ideal liberal state."); PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSIOy: LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND IMMIGRATION 202 (2000) (concluding that "liberal
theory cannot provide a justification for membership control and remain a coherent
political philosophy"); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85 (1984) (noting that "in a truly liberal polity, it would be difficult to
justify a restrictive immigration law or perhaps any immigration law at all").
88. Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 257, 257 (2002).
89. Id. at 258.
90. Id. at 265.
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 265.
93. See COLE, supra note 87, at 186 ("What is ...crucial here is to realise that there
are two groups subjected to the laws of the state: its own members, and those nonmembers who are applying for inclusion.").
94. See Carens, supra note 79, at 256 (arguing that "anyone who wants to be moral
will feel obliged to justify the use of force against other human beings, whether they are
members of the same society or not" and that "we can take it as a basic presupposition
that we should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society as free and
equal moral persons"); Julius, supra note 74, at 188 (suggesting that "you shouldn't use
other people by directing their action to your benefit unless you can show that the resulting sequence of actions and results is something they themselves have reason to want to
come about," which demands "an equal consideration of other people's interests"); id.at
181 ("If I impose terms on you, I am required to make them acceptable to you. I trigger
this requirement just by intending to coerce you .
95. Blake, supra note 88, at 280 n.30.
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he claims that the justification that we owe to a prospective immigrant
"would be significantly different from that offered to a present member for
the web of legal coercion within which she currently lives" and that only
inequality among "current" members of our society "gives rise to a legitimate concern for relative deprivation." 96 This limit on the justification
owed to the prospective immigrant seems at odds with Blake's broad claim
that "Rawls's ... theory of justice might profitably be viewed as a theory by
which the coercive force of the state might be justified to free and equal
persons who have a prima facie moral entitlement to be free from all coercion."'97 Blake does not qualify this claim based on the nature or the scope
of the coercion to be justified. As Seyla Benhabib observes:
[A]s a moral being you have a fundamental right to justification ....
Your
freedom can be restricted only through reciprocally and generally justifiable
norms which equally apply to all. In the sphere of morality, generality
means universality; universality refers to what would be valid for all human
beings considered as being equally entitled to respect and concern .... 98

Blake's treatment of immigration begs the question: Why should the prospective immigrant accept a justification for our immigration laws that
does not offer the alien the equal concern embodied in the Rawlsian original position, including a concern for relative deprivation?
It is unclear why we should limit our concern for relative deprivation
to those currently living within our "web of legal coercion." If the claim is
that prospective immigrants are burdened in only a minor way by our
immigration laws, which therefore require little justification, then this
empirical claim is questionable, given the significant harm suffered by
those excluded from our labor market. Although prospective immigrants
do not currently live under all of our laws, this fact does not diminish the
coercion that they suffer and the costs that they bear under our immigration laws. This fact may change the law in question that requires justification, but it should not change what counts as a justification. That is, a
defense of our immigration laws must give the aliens coerced by our state
the same equal concern extended to citizens coerced by our state, including a concern for relative deprivation.
Even if we grant Blake's claim that one must live within our web of
coercive laws to be entitled to a concern for relative deprivation, we must
extend such concern to the unauthorized immigrant who also lives within
this web. For example, if we seek to deport the unauthorized immigrant as
a means of enforcing our immigration laws, then the immigrant may
demand that we justify those laws in terms that reflect concern for the
relative deprivation that we impose through those laws. This right to distributive justice may well block deportation in the case of an immigrant
who would be excludable at the border in the absence of such a right. Yet it
96. Id.
97. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).

98. SEYaL
(2004).

BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
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seems perverse and unfair to give the unauthorized immigrant a right to
distributive justice that we do not extend to the prospective immigrant who
obediently complies with our immigration laws. Such a stance invites prospective immigrants to enter illegally so that they may obtain this right. Yet
if we cite the unauthorized immigrant's violation of our immigration laws
as the reason to deny that immigrant a right to distributive justice, then
how are we to respond to that immigrant's demand that we justify those
immigration laws first? After all, we owe even criminals a justification for
the laws we invoke to punish them, and Blake agrees that "a concern for
relative deprivation" is relevant in such a demand for justification. 9 9
B. Collective Self-Governance
If we deny the unauthorized immigrant a right to distributive justice,
then we must be requiring something more than simply living under our
web of coercive laws to generate such a right. One response to this problem might be to distinguish both prospective and unauthorized immigrants
from citizens by pointing to some other feature of citizens. Thomas Nagel,
for example, suggests that "the objection to arbitrary inequalities" arises
only among "fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively
imposed legal and political institutions that generates such arbitrary inequalities." 10 0 He claims that "[iut is only from such a system, and from our
fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to
democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity,
and the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods." 10 1 Similarly, Stephen Macedo asserts
that we should confine "the extensive obligation of distributive justice to
self-governing and self-responsible political communities: peoples who
share a common political life and who exercise extensive authority over
10
one another."'

2

Like Blake, Nagel notes that a regime's "requirements claim our active
'1 0 3
cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done without justification."
By participation in such a collective enterprise, however, Nagel means
more than mere cooperation through obedience. The law-abiding prospective immigrant, after all, cooperates with us by complying with our immigration laws. Nagel stresses that "we are both putative joint authors of the
coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to accept
their authority.' 0 4 Prospective and unauthorized immigrants are not
putative joint authors of our immigration laws. Furthermore, Nagel
claims, "the laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to
99. Blake, supra note 88, at 276.
100. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33

PHIL.

& PUB. AFF. 113, 128

(2005).
101. Id. at 127.
102. Stephen Macedo, What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism,
Diversity and The Law of Peoples, 72 FORDHAm L. REv. 1721, 1731 (2004).
103. Nagel, supra note 100, at 129.
104. Id. at 128.
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105
accept and uphold those laws."
It is obscure, however, in what sense prospective immigrants are not
"asked to accept and uphold those laws," given that we threaten criminal
penalties for aliens who enter illegally. 10 6 Nagel's claim would come as a
surprise to the unauthorized immigrant sentenced to imprisonment for violating our immigration laws. If we do not ask immigrants to "accept and
uphold" these laws, then why do we punish violators? It is difficult to perceive any respect in which we do not ask aliens to "accept and uphold" our
immigration policies, given the way that we treat violators under our laws
and in our public discourse, which seems to regard unauthorized immigrants simply as lawbreakers deserving of punishment.
Furthermore, Nagel's observation that our immigration laws "are not
imposed in their name" 10 7 merely begs the question of whether we should
impose immigration laws that we can justify in the name of all those
affected. His observation provides no persuasive defense for immigration
laws that are too restrictive to be justified in such terms. If Nagel intends
to cite our failure to give equal consideration to the interests of prospective
immigrants as a justification for immigration laws that fail to give their
interests equal consideration, 10 8 then his reasoning would seem to prove
too much.
Consider a society that permits slavery. Suppose it seeks to defend its
laws by noting that the slaves do not participate in that society's collective
enterprise of self-governance and are thus not "putative joint authors of the
coercively imposed system," adding that "the laws are not imposed in their
name." 10 9 This proposed justification would not be persuasive, precisely
because the very fact that the laws exclude the slaves from participation
and are not imposed in their name is a reason to deem the laws unjust.1 10
Therefore, a person's participation in the collective enterprise of self-governance as a "putative joint author[ I of the coercively imposed system" 1 1 '

105. Id. at 130.
106. Any alien guilty of improper entry may be imprisoned for up to six months "for
the first commission of any such offense" and for up to two years "for a subsequent
commission of any such offense." 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2000). Furthermore, any alien previously ordered removed who thereafter "enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time
found in... the United States" may be imprisoned for up to two years and under certain
specified conditions may be imprisoned for up to 20 years. Id. § 1326. Criminal prosecutions of such aliens under these provisions have increased dramatically in recent
years. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 248 (2003); James C.
McKinley, Jr., Tougher Tactics Deter Migrants at U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at
AO.
107. Nagel, supra note 100, at 130.
108. See id. at 129-30.
109. See id. at 128, 130.
110. As AJ. Julius observes, "[Tihere is no obvious respect in which the laws of the
antebellum United States can be said to have been enacted in the name of the slaves."
Julius, supra note 74, at 183. In a regime of "naked tyranny," as Julius notes, "[pleople do
what the tyrant tells them to do so that he will not kill them," and the problem with
Nagel's theory is that Nagel "cannot find injustice in their situation," yet "it is hard to
agree that the society is not unjust." Id.
111. Nagel, supra note 100, at 128.
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cannot be a necessary condition for that person's right to distributive justice in that system. If we reject the proposed defense of slavery on the
ground that the exclusion of slaves from political participation and from
the sphere of equal concern is unjust and a violation of human rights, then
we beg the question: Are restrictive immigration laws also unjust because
they exclude both prospective and unauthorized immigrants from full participation in our society? 1 2 Before we cite participation in self-governance
as a basis for the right to distributive justice, we must first demonstrate
that the restrictions we impose on this participation, including immigration restrictions, are themselves justified. The implicit assumption is that
we are justified in discounting the welfare of prospective immigrants when
we formulate our immigration laws. This proposed justification for our
immigration laws would suffer from circular reasoning if it ultimately
relies on an assumption that these laws are just.
C.

Involuntary Residence

We might distinguish immigrants from natives on the ground that
immigrants seek to associate with us voluntarily whereas natives are born
into our society and have no choice. Nagel, for example, stresses "the contingency of involuntary rather than voluntary association," claiming that
"[a]n institution that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of
13
membership that meet a higher standard" than voluntary associations."
Similarly, Joseph Heath notes that "being born into society is a circumstance, while moving into one is a choice,"'114 arguing that "involuntarily
incurred obligations must meet a much higher standard in order to be considered binding."' 1 5 In particular, Heath claims that "[tihe conditions
under which immigrants secure admittance ...

are not involuntary," and,

therefore, "the strict criterion of equality ... need not apply."' 16 This distinction would allow us to justify not only laws discriminating against
unauthorized or prospective immigrants but also nativist laws that fail to
extend equal concern to legal immigrants after admission.
This suggestion seems to turn liberalism on its head insofar as it entitles natives in rich countries to advantages based on immutable circumstances of birth. Nagel concedes that "[wie do not deserve to have been
born into a particular society any more than we deserve to have been born
into a particular family," yet he maintains that only natives enjoy a presumption against arbitrary inequality, "so an arbitrary distinction is
112. As Pogge recalls: "[Eiven the injustices we now recognize as the most conspicuous (slavery and the inferior status of women) were once entirely taken for granted.
Those advantaged by them found it easy not to think about them or, at best, to invoke
some shallow rationalizations ....
POGGE, supra note 73, at 278. He asks: "Are we
today any more immune to comfortable errors of moral judgment?" Id.
113. Nagel, supra note 100, at 133.
114. Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Social Contract, 10 C~AN.J.L.
&
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343, 350 (1997).

115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 355.
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responsible for the scope of the presumption against arbitrariness."' "17
This suggestion seems to fly in the face of reality when those born in rich
countries cite the circumstances of their birth as if it were some sort of
disadvantage justifying privileges not extended to those born in poor countries who seek to move "voluntarily" into those rich countries. After all,
those born into poor countries involuntarily incur poverty and the legal
obligation to comply with the immigration laws of rich countries. Given
those realities, why not impose the same standard of distributive justice to
bind prospective immigrants under our immigration laws as we apply to
natives under other laws? A view more sensitive to social, legal, and economic realities would recognize the claims of prospective immigrants based
on all the burdens that they have involuntarily incurred.
Nagel and Heath assume that natives are not free to emigrate and
therefore reside involuntarily in their country of origin. They may base
their assumption on a realistic evaluation of the feasibility of emigration
under current conditions. Insofar as they base this assumption on the
immigration barriers raised by other countries, however, they make our
right to distributive justice curiously contingent on the immigration policies of other countries. 118 If another country opens its borders to some,
most, or all prospective migrants from our country, do those who are free
to emigrate become voluntary residents who are therefore not entitled to
distributive justice? 19
Nagel and Heath may invoke not only legal barriers to migration but
also those barriers raised in practice by the social or economic costs of
migration for the individual migrant. Heath, for example, suggests that
"the costs associated with emigration are so high that nationality is defacto
involuntary," conceding that "the distinction between voluntary and involuntary is determined by some notion of which options an individual could
reasonably be expected to exercise."'120 Often, however, these costs are
quite low, as when a native of the United States contemplates migration to
Canada, or when a native of Australia contemplates migration to New Zealand. If such emigration is quite easy for the native, then does this option
undermine that native's claim to distributive justice? Furthermore, once
we recognize that the difference between "involuntary" residence and "voluntary" migration is not only a matter of degree, but also a question of
what options we should deem "reasonable," then the claims advanced by
117. Nagel, supra note 100, at 128.
118. If Nagel and Heath base this assumption on barriers to immigration raised by
other countries, then their claims beg the question of whether both natives and the foreign-born should ideally enjoy greater freedom of movement across borders. See, e.g.,
Seyla Benhabib, The Law of Peoples, DistributiveJustice, and Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1761, 1774 (2004) (suggesting that "liberal peoples ought to have fairly open borders," permitting both "a fundamental right to emigrate" and "the privilege to immigrate,
that is, to enter another peoples' territory and become a member of its society
peacefully").
119. Some neighboring countries do in fact allow for "relatively easy migration" on a
regional basis. Johnson, supra note 106, at 240-41; see, e.g., Larry Rohter, South American Trading Bloc Frees Movement of Its People, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at A6.
120. Heath, supra note 114, at 351 n.25.
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Nagel and Heath beg the question: Should we regard residence in a poor
country to be so costly as to make it unreasonable for us to expect the
prospective migrant to refrain from migration to a rich country?
D.

The Absence of a Cosmopolitan State

Macedo rejects claims of cosmopolitan distributive justice, finding it
"hard to understand the reasonableness of making people responsible for
the welfare of others without also making them responsible for their governance."' 121 "Cosmopolitan distributive justice," he concludes, "makes no
sense absent a cosmopolitan state."'122 Even if we assume that the absence
of a cosmopolitan state implies some limits on global distributive justice,
however, this absence would not justify immigration restrictions that neglect principles of global distributive justice. After all, the admission of any
given set of immigrants would make us "responsible for their governance"
as well as responsible for their welfare. Upon joining our society, the
immigrant could agree to the same terms of the social contract as the native
born into our society. 1 23 Why should our inability to govern immigrants
prior to admission justify our failure to consider their welfare in the admission decision, as long as we can govern them after admission?
Perhaps the concern is that immigrants may not have paid their fair
share of tax revenues and could thereby unfairly exploit the public treasury
in the country of immigration. Heath, for example, worries that "if states
lifted immigration controls in the current global context, they would open
themselves up to a variety of forms of harmful predation." 1 24 "No welfare
state could survive," he notes, "if people chose to spend their childhood
and retirement in a welfare state, yet their working lives in a low-taxation
state with minimal public services."' 125 These concerns, however, only justify policy responses tailored to those specific concerns, not general restrictions on immigration. We might address such concerns, for example, with
fiscal policies that impose appropriate conditions on immigration. To
ensure that immigrants do not unfairly drain the public treasury, we might
restrict immigrants' access to the particular public entitlements raising
121. Macedo, supra note 102, at 1731.
122. Id. Rawls adopts a similar view of distributive justice. For Rawls, as Samuel
Freeman explains, "Distributive justice in the first instance poses the general problem of
fairly designing the system of basic legal institutions and social norms," and "in the
absence of a world state, there can be no global basic structure on a par with the basic
structure of society." SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 305-06
(2007). These observations, however, beg the question: Why should the principles of
distributive justice that we bring to bear on "basic legal institutions" such as immigration policy fail to extend equal concern to those born outside the country of immigration? Why not adopt a broader view of distributive justice and apply principles of global
justice in the normative evaluation of immigration policies?
123. Regarding prospective immigrants outside "the borders of the rich nations" who
are "desperate for the opportunity to become part of those national communities," Peter
Singer observes: "There is no reason to think that, if we admitted them, they would be
any less ready than native-born citizens to reciprocate whatever benefits they receive

from the community."

SINGER,

supra note 77, at 169-70.

124. Heath, supra note 114, at 347.
125. Id. at 348.
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those concerns, for example, or impose special taxes on immigrants as a
form of admission fee in appropriate cases. These policies would be less
restrictive than immigration restrictions that exclude prospective immigrants from our country entirely and thereby needlessly destroy gains from
trade in the labor market.1 26 More important, any such concern would
seem to raise questions only regarding the particular policies that could be
justified within a framework of equal concern. Fiscal concerns do not provide much of a reason to question the basic premise that any law is morally
justified only if its rationale extends equal concern to all those affected.
We might say the same regarding suggestions that liberal immigration
policies would pose various other problems. For example, Heath worries
that liberal immigration could undermine the incentives for "the provision
of public goods for future generations, by such measures as encouraging a
high rate of savings, controlling public debt, preventing long-term environ12 7
mental degradation, [and] implementing population control measures."'
Rawls expresses similar concerns, worrying that people may be tempted to
"make up for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural
resources ...

by migrating into other people's territory."' 128 If Heath and

Rawls are worried about the incentives to invest in local public goods in
countries of emigration, then two considerations suggest that their concerns provide little support for immigration restrictions.
First, we should recognize that it is entirely appropriate for a country
of emigration to take future emigration into account in deciding how much
to invest in local public goods. Insofar as emigration implies a smaller
126. See Chandran Kukanthas, The Case for Open Immigration, in CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 208, 213 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman
eds., 2005) (noting that "[ilf the concern is to preserve the integrity of the welfare state,
* . . the most that could be justified is restricting membership of the welfare system,"
which "would be better than no opportunity to move at all").
127. Heath, supra note 114, at 348. Heath worries, for example, that "if China could
count on an ability to export its surplus population to less crowded parts of the world,
the incentive to control it would be considerably diminished." Id.; see also David Miller,
Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES INAPPLIED ETHICS, supra note
126, at 193, 201 ("A viable population policy ... requires each state to be responsible
for stabilizing ... its population over time, and this is going to be impossible ... if there
are no restrictions on the movement of people between states."). We should weigh such
claims against the empirical evidence indicating that migration "may accelerate the
slowing of population growth," because "[m]igrants who move from high-fertility to lowfertility regions or their descendants often adopt the reduced-fertility patterns of their
new home, with some time delay." Joel E. Cohen, Human Population Grows Up, Sci. Am.,
Sept. 2005, at 48, 54; see Francine D. Blau, The Fertilityof Immigrant Women: Evidence
from High-Fertility Source Countries, in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE 93, 127
(George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1992) (reporting "indirect evidence suggesting that immigrant women have fewer children in the United States than they would
have had in the source country"); Eric Neumayer, The Environment: One More Reason to
Keep Immigrants Out?, 59 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 204, 206 (2006) ("[I]f forced to remain in
their developing sending country ....
would-be emigrants are likely to have more children than they will in their chosen country of destination"). Furthermore, as "remittance payments are likely to spur economic development" and "more developed
countries have lower fertility rates," emigration would be "likely" to "have a negative
rather than positive effect on birth rates in receiving countries." Id.
128. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 39 (1999).
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population in the future than would otherwise exist, the benefits derived
from a local public good will be smaller, and a reduced investment in such
a good would be socially optimal. A legitimate concern arises only if the
prospect of future emigration leads some residents in the country of emigration to withdraw support for even this optimal level of investment
because they anticipate their own future emigration.
Second, even if the prospect of emigration distorts investment below
the optimal level, there are probably better policy responses available to the
country of immigration than immigration restrictions. If the country of
immigration is actually concerned about local public goods in countries of
emigration, then the country of immigration can always use its jurisdiction
over immigrants to collect tax revenue from them to finance subsidies for
investments in public goods in countries of emigration. Such subsidies
would be better than the exclusion of prospective immigrants insofar as a
policy of exclusion needlessly destroys gains from trade in the labor
market.
Heath may also be worried about incentives to invest in public goods
in the country of immigration.129 Immigrants may congest local public
goods and thereby reduce the return that natives enjoy on their investment
in these public goods. 130 Again, we would have these concerns even
within a framework of distributive justice for all and could address these
concerns through measures more narrowly tailored than general immigration restrictions. We could, for example, charge immigrants an appropriate
fee for access to any public good subject to congestion without imposing
other immigration restrictions. Such fees can internalize negative externalities from immigration, deter inefficient immigration, and compensate
natives for any congestion of local public goods arising from immigration. 13 ' We can weigh all of these concerns against the claims of the immigrant in deciding what policy responses are appropriate.
After all, similar concerns also arise within a society in the absence of
any immigration. We may worry that redistribution from the rich to the
poor, for example, undermines the incentives of poor families to save or to
have fewer children. 13 2 I do not deny that similar concerns may arise with
liberal immigration policies. My only claim is that our policy response to
these concerns in the immigration context should extend equal concern
and respect to all those affected, just as our policy response to similar concerns in the domestic context should be based on equal concern and
129. See Heath, supra note 114, at 347.
130. See Miller, supra note 127, at 202 (worrying about immigration's "impacts on the
physical environment," such as "congestion" and reduced "access to open space").
131. Id.
132. Peter Singer criticizes "Rawls's readiness to invoke, against the idea of economic
redistribution between nations, arguments that could easily be brought ... against economic redistribution between individuals or families within the same nation." SINGER,
supra note 77, at 178. "Both cases raise a problem for anyone who supports the redistribution of wealth, and if the problem can be answered in the case of redistribution within
a society," as Singer notes, there would appear to be "no reason why it cannot be
answered in the case of redistribution between societies." Id.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 41

respect. If we understand in the domestic context that it is unfair for a
native born into a large and poor family to suffer as a result of circumstances beyond his or her control, for example, then we should also understand in the immigration context that it is unfair for an alien born into a
poor and populous country to suffer as a result of similar circumstances.1 33 I have suggested that the attempts by some liberal theorists
and philosophers to distinguish immigration policies from laws in the
domestic context in this regard are all ultimately question-begging.
Conclusion
As Philippe Legrain observes, advances in transportation and telecommunication technology, together with the "individualism" fostered by the
spread of liberal ideals, have allowed us to "roam our newly open world
more freely than before" and have "undermined the tyranny of geography
which tied people to a place and loosened the shackles of nationalism
which dictated that people in one place should all be alike." 13 4 In this
globalizing world, he suggests, "[o]ur efforts to keep poor people out" of
rich countries "are a form of global apartheid," and "if our conscience is
not sufficient to persuade us to change course, then our self-interest surely
ought to."'1

35

I have argued that a survey of the evidence on the economic

effects of migration supports these normative claims.
Estimates of the magnitude of the gains that the nations of the world
could enjoy by liberalizing international migration indicate that even partial liberalization would not only produce substantial increases in the
world's real income but also improve its distribution. Although the economic effects of immigration on native workers and distributive justice
among natives are often advanced as reasons to reduce immigration, these
concerns do not provide a sound justification for our restrictive immigration laws. Instead, the appropriate response to concerns about the distribution of income among natives is to increase the progressivity of our tax
system. Protectionist immigration policies are not only likely to be relatively costly as an instrument for redistribution but also perverse from the
standpoint of global justice.
133.

See Kok-Chor Tan, Critical Notice, 31 CAN. J. PHIL. 133, 122 (2001) (reviewing

RAwLS, supra note 128) (noting that "[oin Rawls's own reasoning, a person born into a
society with poor population control and economic policies cannot be said to deserve
her fate any more than another born into more favorable circumstances," because
"[tlhese are mere accidents of birth, and are as morally arbitrary as is being born into
wealth or poverty in the domestic context"). Natives of rich countries may claim that it
is unfair to saddle them with the claims of poor immigrants because conditions in poor
countries are largely outside of the control of the natives of rich countries. This claim,
however, reflects an incongruous notion of fairness. This notion is sensitive to the burdens imposed on natives of rich countries for reasons outside their control, yet simultaneously insensitive to the burdens imposed on those born in poor countries, despite the
fact that their circumstances of birth are entirely outside their control.
134. PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, IMMIGRANTS: YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS THEM 323-24 (2006).
135. Id. at 324.

2008

The Economics of International Labor Migration

25

I have suggested that liberal ideals require a global view of distributive
justice, and I have outlined critiques of some of the alternative conceptions
of justice advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan perspective. I conclude
that considerations of not only economic efficiency but also distributive
justice militate in favor of liberalized migration. Considerations of distributive justice suggest that liberal states should seek to liberalize their immigration policies, thereby reducing global inequalities in economic
opportunity. 136 It is incumbent upon liberal states to pursue such liberalizing reforms if they are to remain faithful to the egalitarian ideals that they
espouse.

136. The immigration bill debated by the Senate in 2006 would have liberalized the
ceiling on the number of guest-worker visas annually in response to excess demand for
those visas. See Senate Resumes Comprehensive Immigration Reform Debate, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 981 (2006). Before passing that bill, however, the Senate amended the

bill to fix that ceiling at 200,000 visas per year. ld.

